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CHAPTER 1 (UNCLASSIFIED) 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
This manual establishes doctrines and procedures 
for Chemical Corps intelligence activities and sets 
forth the responsibilities of the Chemical Corps in 
production of technical intelligence. These doc-
trines are based on those contained in FM 30-16. 
2. Scope 
a. Chemical Corps organization, functions, opera-
tions, and responsibilities for the collection, pro-
duction, and dissemination of CBR intelligence 
are described in sufficient detail to give an under-
standing of the chemical intelligence contribution 
to the total military intelligence effort. 
b. Recommendations for corrections and changes 
should be forwarded to the Chief of Chemical Officer, 
Building T-7, Gravelly Point, Washington 25, D. C. 
3. Definitions 
a. CBR Intelligence. CBR intelligence refers 
collectively to chemical warfare (CW), biological 
warfare (BW), and radiological warfare (RW), 
intelligence. The term includes foreign scientific, 
political, social, industrial, geographic, and economic 
factors which affect or influence CBR intelligence. 
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b. CBR Warfare. This term has three aspects for 
definition: 
(1) Chemical warfare (CW) involves the tactics 
and techniques of conducting warfare by 
the use of toxic chemicals and smoke or 
incendiary agents to inflict casualties or a 
desired disadvantage upon the enemy. 
(2) Biological warfare (BW) is the military 
use of Ii ving organisms or their toxic 
products to cause death, disability, or 
damage to man, his domestic animals, 
or crops. 
(3) Radiological warfare (RW) involves the 
tactics and techniques of conducting war-
fare by using radioactive materials or 
methods which will result in the production 
of casualties by radiation. 
c. Intelligence Targets. Enemy and/or foreign 
personnel, document centers, CBR installations, 
facilities, or depots which are suitable targets for 
exploitation by intelligence task force operations 
under G2 direction (FM 30-16). 
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CHAPTER 2 (UNCLASSIFIED) 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Section I. GENERAL 
4. Principles 
a. CBR intelligence is an integral part of the total 
military intelligence effort and is essential in military 
operations. CBR intelligence factors may often be 
the principal elements determining the feasibility of 
execution of proposed military operations. 
b. CBR intelligence relates directly to Chemical 
Corps functions at all levels. It is essential to the 
formulation and implementation of Chemical Corps 
plans as well as Army tactical plans and operations in 
a theater of operations. 
c. CBR intelligence about a particular theater of 
operations may concern other theaters and should be 
made available promptly to them and to the Depart-
ment of the Army (FM 30-16). 
d. CBR intelligence in a theater of operations will 
be collected from all available sources (Fl\'1 30-16). 
e. All Chemical Corps personnel must be alert for 
opportunities to collect and forward information of 
value to the Chemical Corps and to all intelligence 
organizations. 
f. Chemical Corps field personnel are responsible 
for protecting captured enemy CBR materiel until its 
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usefulness and intelligence value can be fully de-
termined by qualified personnel. 
5. Role of Chemical Corps Intelligence 
a. CBR intelligence of a scope commensurate 
with each level of command is required by the com-
mander to properly arrive at a strategic or tactical 
command decision or to formulate either an oper-
ational or strategic plan. It is one of the essential 
elements without which no intelligence picture is 
complete. The possibility and/or probability of the 
use of CBR weapons by an enemy, his level of CBR 
training, the effectiveness of his offensive and de-
fensive CBR equipment, and the enemy's potential 
for developing and waging CBR warfare are im-
portant considerations at every level of military 
planning. 
b. The Department of the Army levies upon the 
Chief Chemical Officer specific intelligence responsi-
bilities for worldwide collection of CBR information 
and materials of military significance from all sources. 
The Chief Chemical Officer, in turn, has established 
the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency 
(COIA) to direct the CBR collection effort and to 
evaluate, produce, maintain, and disseminate intelli-
gence studies on CBR doctrine, organization, re-
search and development, tactics, economic and 
scientific resources, and logistical support of the 
chemical services of foreign armed forces. In addi-
tion, the COIA discharges the ·other intelligence 
responsibilities (except counterintelligence) of the 
Chief Chemical Officer, to the intelligence com-
CONFIDENTIAL '1 
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rnunity. CBR intelligence contributions are inte-
grated with all other military intelligence at Depart-
ment of the Army level to produce the essential 
strategic intelligence upon which doctrinal, strategic, 
and logistical planning are based by the appropriate 
agencies within the Department of Defense. 
c. In a theater of operations, other arms and 
services depend upon the Chemical Corps for CBR 
intelligence which may affect their planning and 
operations; conversely, the Theater Army Chemical 
Officer must depend upon other theater staffs and 
agencies for military and technical intelligence which 
may affect CBR planning and operations. Proper 
liaison must be maintained between staff chemical 
officers and other staffs and agencies at all echelons 
for rapid exchange of technical information and 
intelligence matter. Due to its peculiar significance 
often communications zone and army group com-
manders are particularly concerned with CBR 
intelligence to a considerably greater degree than 
with general combat intelligence. 
Section II. TYPES OF CHEMICAL CORPS 
INTELLIGENCE 
6. General 
Chemical Corps intelligence is one of the technical 
aspects of military intelligence; it contributes both 
tactical and technical components to combat intelli-
gence and encompasses certain obvious strategic and 
counterintelligence functions. 
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7. Strategic Intelligence 
Strategic intelligence is produced in peace and in 
war, usually by theater and higher headquarters or 
by agencies under their control. It is used chiefly 
by senior military commanders and their staffs in 
the development of operational plans. In its three 
main forms, basic studies, current intelhgence, and 
staff intelligence, strategic intelligence deals with 
established conditions, recent events, and future 
probabilities in foreign areas. 
a. Basic Studies. Chemical Corps intelligence 
contributes to basic surveys of strategic intelligence, 
delineating the known (or estimated) organization, 
personnel, doctrine, training, weapons, CBR capa-
bilities, materiel production, and stockpiles of foreign 
armed forces. It also encompasses civilian scien-
tific personnel, equipment, training, and plans and 
organization for defense against CBR attack. It 
collects and analyzes data on industrial research and 
development, and laboratory equipment, facilities, 
and production. Such surveys and studies may be 
combined with economic, political, sociological, and 
other military studies to serve Government and mili-
tary needs in the development of policies and plans, 
and in operations. 
b. Current Intelligence. Chemical Corps intelli-
gence contributes analyses and evaluations of the 
CBR aspects of recent trends and current develop-
ments in a foreign area. It estimates their probable 
effect upon governmental and military policy-
making, planning, supply, and operations. 
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c. Staff Intelligence. Chemical Corps intelligence 
contributes to estimates of future possibilities or 
probabilities, analyses, and evaluations of specific 
CBR data to determine their significance as indica-
tions that the foreign area in"olved is preparing for 
operations inimical or disadvantageous to the United 
States (FM 30-5). 
8. Combat Intelligence 
Combat intelligence is produced primarily in the 
field in time of war and is used principally by tac-
tical commanders and their staffs. It is concerned 
with a relatively local situation: the enemy forces 
and equipment opposing a combat unit, and the 
weather and terrain which affect the unit. 
a. Tactical Intelligence. CBR aspects of tactical 
intelligence are invaluable for tactical planning. 
This intelligence must be disseminated promptly to 
appropriate headquarters to insure that it will be of 
maximum value to those concerned with strategic as 
well as tactical intelligence matters. In many cases, 
combat intelligence studies will be similar in form to 
the basic studies of strategic intelligence. 
b. Technical Intelligence. CBR aspects of tech-
nical intelligence in a theater of operations deal with 
evaluation of evidence indicating enemy use, poten-
tial, or intentions concerning the use of CBR weap-
ons, exploitation of captured enemy materiel and 
documents, and technical information about the 
enemy. 
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9. Relation Between Strategic and Combat Intelli-
gence 
Both strategic and combat intelJigence are con-
cerned with information of military significance 
about foreign powers and with actual or possible 
areas of operations. Certain CBR intelligence of 
value in tactical operations will be found in basic 
studies of conditions in foreign areas. On the other 
hand, strategic intelligence may be developed from 
information obtained through CBR combat 
intelligence. 
10. Counterintelligence 
General counterintelligence measures are de-
scribed in FM 30-5. 
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CHAPTER 3 (CONFIDENTIAL) 
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS 
Section I. (UNCLASSIFIED) GENERAL 
11. Chief Chemical Officer 
The Chief Chemical Officer is responsible for the 
collection and production of CBR intelligence on 
foreign materiel, facilities, installations, processes, 
procedures, potential, etc., for use throughout the 
Chemical Corps and dissemination through ACSI/ 
DA or G2 at appropriate levels of command to other 
services and agencies as is indicated by the nature of 
the finished intelligence. The Chemical Corps In-
telligence Agency is designated to discharge this 
responsibility for the Chief Chemical Officer. 
12. Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency 
a. General. The Chemical Corps Intelligence 
Agency (COIA) is a Class II installation of the 
Chemical Corps established to produce finished in-
telligence studies on CBR doctrine, organizations, 
research and development, tactics, economic re-
sources, and logistical support of the chemical services 
of foreign armed forces. 
b. Mission. The COIA is charged with accom-
plishing, by using Chemical Corps resources and all 
other available intelligence sources, the collection, 
final evaluation, production, maintenance, and dis-
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semination of chemical, biological, and radiological 
(CBR) intelligence for the Chemical Corps, the De-
partment of the Army, and other members of the 
intelligence community. 
c. The Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency-
(1) Produces basic intelligence studies and esti-
mates for Chemical Corps organizational 
elements and contributes to the total na-
tional intelligence surveys. 
(2) Coordinates CBR intelligence levies of other 
agencies upon Chemical Corps organiza-
tional elements. 
(3) Exercises staff supervision over the pre-
assignment training of Chemical Corps 
organizational elements. 
(4) Fills requirements for Chemical Detachment 
(Technical Intelligence) (CD (TI)) and 
other trained CBR intelligence personnel 
for oversea or specialized intelligence service 
as levies upon the Chemical Corps are re-
ceived. 
(5) Coordinates with other members of the in-
telligence community the efforts of certain 
CBR intelligence specialists and specialized 
detachments. 
(6) Exercises staff supervision over the opera-
tions of certain TOE organizations, e. g., 
CD(TI)'s engaged in intelligence operations. 
13. Staff Chemical Officers 
a. General. Intelligence personnel are not nor-
mally provided in the chemical sections at all eche-
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Ions of command; therefore, the chemical officer is 
responsible for all Chemical Corps intelligence activ-
ities pertinent to his level of command. At such 
higher levels of command as theater, communications 
zone, joint logistical, field army, or independent corps, 
a CBR intelligence subsection may be organized 
within the chemical section. 
b. Responsibilities. The chemical officer at each 
level of command is responsible for-
14 
(1) The collection, preliminary evaluation, ini-
tial interpretation, and forwarding of all 
known data on enemy targets, personnel, 
CBR research and development activities, 
and enemy CBR materiel obtained from 
lower, adjacent, and higher headquarters 
or Department of the Army documents, 
publications, and reference works to the 
organization that can use the information. 
(2) Informing the G2 of the identity, description 
and location of any CBR installation, facil-
ity or depot which is considered an appro-
priate tactical target. 
(3) Maintaining files or target folders contain-
ing complete details on enemy targets to be 
exploited, special personnel to be located 
and interrogated, special items of enemy 
CBR materiel to be collected and studied, 
and on enemy CBR technical procedures to 
be investigated and evaluated. 
( 4) Informing appropriate personnel and for 
briefing members of attached or assigned 
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CD (TI) 's on specific m1ss10ns to be 
accomplished. 
(5) Establishing liaison with all chemical or 
other depots within his area to insure 
adequate intelligence coverage of all cap-
tured CBR materiel. 
(6) Knowing procedures (FM 30-16) and main-
taining close contact with G2 and the 
technical intelligence coordinator to learn 
of the availability and location of targets 
and personnel to be investigated, and to 
secure access to captured documents of 
interest to the Chemical Corps. 
(7) The field examination and preliminary 
evaluation of all CBR materiel considered 
of primary intelligence interest (app. II). 
(8) The collection of all CBR information de-
rived from captured documents, from in-
terrogation of selected enemy and friendly 
military and civilian personnel, and from 
investigation of CBR intelligence targets. 
c. Liaison. The chemical officer or his represent-
ative is responsible for effecting the liaison necessary 
to insure proper accomplishment of the Chemical 
Corps intelligence mission and maximum effective 
coverage in the CBR intelligence field. Liaison with 
G2, particularly with the G2 technical intelligence 
coordinator, and with intelligence agencies of the 
other technical services at various echelons is essen-
tial. Liaison with intelligence sections of the Air 
Force and the Navy should be established through 
appropriate channels and utilized whenever feasible. 
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14. Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence) 
a. General. Chemical Detachments (Technical 
Intelligence) are allocated to a theater of operations 
as required. Subsequently, they may be attached 
to any of the theater subordinate commands to meet 
the needs of the Chemical Corps intelligence mission. 
Normally these CD(Tl)'s a.re not required at com-
mand levels lower than field army, but may be 
provided at lower echelons by the army commander 
if required. 
b. Duties. Chemical Detachments (Technical In-
telligence) assist the staff chemical officer in his 
responsibility to provide the commander, through 
the G2, with CBR intelligence by preparing intelli-
gence reports, and by performing the duties outlined 
below. 
16 
(I) Collect items of enemy CBR materiel which 
may be of special interest or have intelli-
gence value. 
(2) Make preliminary evaluations of the com-
ponents, use, and effectiveness of collected 
enemy CBR materiel (app. II). 
(3) Assist chemical depot and supply agency 
personnel in instructing other Chemical 
Corps personnel and troop units in the use, 
handling, and maintenance of reissued 
enemy CBR equipment. 
(4) Expedite the flow of all captured enemy 
CBR materiel of intelligence interest to 
the appropriate agency. 
(5) Locate and evaluate CBR intelligence 
targets of all types, including those pre-
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viously designated and those located by the 
detachment and report them to the appro-
priate agency. 
(6) Assist in the interrogation of prisoners of 
war (par. 24e(l)). 
(7) Collect and evaluate CBR information ob-
tained from captured documents and pub-
lications. 
(8) Perform special operations as may be 
required. 
15. Technical Specialists 
a. A primary source of technical specialists for 
consultation or special assignment utilization is the 
Theater Chemical Laboratory Company (TOE 
3-97R). This laboratory company comprises chem-
ical, analytical, engineering and toxicology sections, 
and conducts examinations, evaluations and identi-
fication of materiels related to CBR warfare. Al-
though primarily trained to handle matters pertain-
ing to CBR warfare in the field, utilizing only its 
TOE equipment, this laboratory is usually established 
at a central location where permanent industrial or 
university facilities may be utilized, thereby enabling 
it to handle almost any chemical problem arising 
from military operations in the field. 
b. Should a mobile chemical laboratory (TOE 
3-500R) be stationed nearby when technical assist-
ance is required, a capability in personnel and equip-
ment worthy of investigation may be presumed 
despite its limitations when compared with the 
theater base laboratory mentioned above. 
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c. Primary responsibility for identification of 
enemy BW agents has been levied upon the medical 
service, thus assuring the presence of technically 
qualified personnel to augment the bacteriologists or 
biochemists on the staff of the CD (TI) 's. 
d. Chemical materiel and supply specialists are 
available at depots and other Chemical Corps in-
stallations within the theater. 
e. Personnel in any of the categories mentioned 
may serve as consultants in their own fields, or may 
be assigned temporarily to CD(TI)'s or other intelli-
gence units to investigate special problems in the 
CBR intelligence field. 
16. Combat Units 
Chemical Corps intelligence personnel are not 
normally provided at headquarters lower than field 
army (or independently operating corps), but Chem-
ical Corps personnel of all units are expected to be 
alert for and to investigate CBR incidents and to 
render reports on information and materiel of special 
CBR intelligence value. Division and army group 
chemical staff officers are concerned with the collec-
tion, safeguarding, reporting and initial examination 
of captured foreign materiel, facilities, and installa-
tions, and with the immediate evacuation of captured 
foreign materiel of CBR intelligence interest. Under 
special conditions Chemical Detachments (Technical 
Intelligence) or Chemical Corps intelligence officers 
may be assigned by the army commanders to facili-
tate or expedite the exploitation of productive CBR 
intelligence areas. Commanders of other than 
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Chemical Corps units are also responsible for report-
ing CBR intelligence matters (app. III). 
Section II. (CONFIDENTIAL) ECHELONS 
17. (CONFIDENTIAL) Theater Army Chemical 
Officer 
The theater army chemical officer is responsible 
for planning for and operation of the theater chem-
ical service. His intelligence responsibilities include: 
a. (UNCLASSIFIED) Staff supervision of all 
CBR intelligence activities at theater level to insure 
maximum exploitation of all available sources of 
information and materiel having CBR intelligence 
value. 
b. (UNCLASSIFIED) The forwarding of CBR 
intelligence to the Department of the Army and 
dissemination through appropriate channels to all 
theater agencies concerned. 
c. (UNCLASSIFIED) The establishment of liai-
son with other governmental intelligence agencies 
operating within the theater and with such other 
groups as may be desirable. 
d. (UNCLASSIFIED) Recommending the alloca-
tion of Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelli-
gence) to lower commands. 
e. (CONFIDENTIAL) Directing the chemical 
servfce effort within the theater as pertains to the 
collection, classification, storage, and reissue (if 
desirable) of all captured CBR equipment and ma-
teriel by appropriate sections of chemical and other 
depots within the theater. Intelligence responsibili-
ties concerning captured CBR items include-
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(1) (UNCLASSIFIED) Based upon Chemical 
Corps responsibility for issue-the prepara-
tion of complete preliminary instructions 
on the operation and maintenance within 
the theater of such items and for the 
full utilization of such materiel captured 
in large quantities. 
(2) (CONFIDENTIAL) Based on Chemical 
Corps responsibility f.or design-
( a) (CONFIDENTIAL) The processing of 
such Items "for nameplate and factory 
marking data and rubbings. 
(b) (UNCLASSIFIED) The preliminary anal-
ysis and description of the characteristics 
of such items. 
( c) (UN CLASSIFIED) The forwarding of 
selected samples of such items to the 
Department of the Army for final 
analysis. 
(d) (UNCLASSIFIED) The transmission of 
reports pertaining to (b) and (c) above 
to the Department of the Army or to 
such installation as he may designate. 
(e) (UNCLASSIFIED) The transmission, at 
theater army level, of captured CBR 
items and related information collected 
within the theater for which the Chemical 
Corps has issue responsibility, to the 
theater technical service having design 
responsibility for the items. 
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18. (UNCLASSIFIED) Army Group Chemical 
Officer 
a. Since the army group is primarily tactical, 
the chemical officer will be chiefly concerned with 
those intelligence activities which may influence 
the tactical operations of the field armies. Under 
certain conditions CD(TI)'s may be allocated to an 
army group. 
b. The intelligence duties and responsibilities of 
the army group chemical officer, under the general 
staff coordination of G2, will include-
(1) The staff supervision of all CBR intelligence 
activities under the jurisdiction of the 
army group. 
(2) Operational control of CD(Tl)'s assigned 
or attached to the army group. 'I'his will 
not be construed to limit the prerogative 
of the field commander in prescribing the 
degree of control to be exercised by a special 
staff officer. 
(3) Cooperation with other technical services 
and intelligence agencies to obtain samples 
of captured materiel of interest to the 
Chemical Corps. 
(4) Distribution of completed reports on the 
processing of captured materiel of in-
terest to the Department of the Army and 
dissemination of the information and in-
telligence developed therefrom to the army 
group G2 and the chemical officer of the 
next higher command. 
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(5) Assuring detailed investigation by appro-
priate intelligence· units of new CBR 
targets uncovered during operations; fur-
nishing required assistance in completing 
CBR target investigations begun earlier 
by other units; providing assistance to 
CD (TI)'s operating in the army group 
area but not assigned or attached to the 
army group. 
19. (UNCLASSIFIED) Field Army Chemical Officer 
a. General. The TOE does not provide for a 
Chemical Corps intelligence subsection within the 
chemical section of the field army. CD(TI)'s 
may be assigned to the field army to assist the chemi-
cal officer in the tactical and technical aspects of his 
intelligence mission. 
b. Tactical Intelligence Functions. The tactical 
intelligence duties and responsibilities of the field 
army chemical officer, under the general staff co-
ordination of G2, will include-
22 
(1) The supervision of all intelligence activities 
of field army Chemical Corps units to 
insure maximum utilization of all available 
sources of information and materials of 
intelligence value. 
(2) The full utilization and exploitation of all 
CBR intelligence developed by field army 
units for maximum benefit to the field army. 
Assistance of higher echelons should be 
sought whenever local exploitation is not 
feasible. 
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(3) Cooperation and liaison with other staff and 
intelligence agencies to obtain information 
and materials of CBR intelligence value. 
(4) The collection, critical comparison (collation), 
evaluation, and interpretation of information 
and materials forwarded by Chemical Corps 
personnel and units of lower commands. 
(5) The prompt dissemination of pertinent CBR 
intelligence information and reports to 
higher, lower, and adjacent commands. 
c. Technical Intelligence Functions. The specific 
technical intelligence duties and responsibilities of 
the field army chemical officer, under the general 
staff coordination of G2, will include-
(1) The operational control of assigned or 
attached CD(TI)'s to insure maximum 
recovery and collection of captured CBR 
items, exploitation of CBR intelligence 
targets and other sources of information, 
and utilization of the CBR materiel and 
military intelligence developed within the 
army area (par. 18b(2)). 
(2) The maintenance of a suitable target file for 
his area of operations. 
(3) Cooperation with representatives of other 
technical services and intelligence agencies 
to obtain samples of captured enemy 
materiel of CBR intelligence interest. 
(4) The furnishing of technical assistance to 
chemical and other depots as required for 
inspection, study, evaluation, and prepara-
tion of reports on captured CBR items. 
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( 5) The prompt distribution of completed re-
ports to field army G2, and higher com-
mands, on the processing of captured CBR 
items and the dissemination of information 
and intelligence developed from them; also 
the transmission of samples of such items to 
the chemical officers of higher commands. 
20. (UNCLASSIFIED) Corps Chemical Officer 
Since the army corps is primarily a tactical unit, 
only those factors of military and CBR intelligence 
which have a direct influence on tactical operations 
will be of primary concern to the corps. 
a. The corps chemical officer must maintain 
liaison with all components of the corps to gain 
prompt knowledge of CBR or related intelligence 
which will affect corps operations. Conversely, such 
liaison is also necessary for the prompt dissemination 
of military and CBR intelligence obtained through 
corps agencies or from high commands. 
b. Under special conditions, Chemical Detach-
ments (Technical Intelligence) from the field army 
may be attached to the corps under the operational 
control of the corps chemical officer. 
c. When an army corps operates independently, 
the corps chemical officer assumes the intelligence 
responsibilities and duties of a field army chemical 
officer. 
21. (UNCLASSIFIED) Division Chemical Officer 
The division chemical officer, under the general 
staff coordination of G2, has the following intelligence 
responsibilities: 
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a. The supervision of CBR intelligence activities 
and cooperation with other technical services and 
intelligence agencies to insure maximum recovery 
and recollection of captured enemy CBR materiel. 
b. Technical supervision and operational control 
of CD(TI)'s attached or assigned from higher 
command. 
c. Technical supervision of captured enemy CBR 
materiel, including the establishment and operation 
of a system for its evacuation, dissemination of infor-
mation about its tactical capabilities and limitations, 
instruction of personnel in its characteristics and use, 
and submission of reports on its processing required 
by G2 or the chemical officer of the next higher 
command. 
22. (UNCLASSIFIED) Unit Commanders 
The unit commanding officer is responsible for the 
collection of CBR intelligence material and intelli-
gence of a tactical nature. Since he is close to the 
source of enemy CBR information and intelligence, 
he must expedite the flow of such materials to the 
appropriate intelligence agencies of higher command 
for study, evaluation, and disposition. He is also 
responsible for the preservation of captured enemy 
CBR materiel suitable for technical exploitation by 
qualified CBR intelligence personnel. 
23. (UN CLASSIFIED) Chemical Corps Units 
Personnel of Chemical Corps units may assist in 
the location and collection of technical information 
through early contact with captured enemy person-
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nel. Chemical Corps unit personnel may perform 
the following specific CBR intelligence functions: 
a. The prevention of careless handling of captured 
CBR materiel before its intelligence value and use-
fulness can be fully ascertained by qualified personnel. 
b. The recognition of enemy equipment or supplies 
which appear to be of special CBR intelligence 
interest to the command, the chemical service or 
other technical service. 
c. The recognition of the presence of individual 
prisoners of war · (or civilians) with specialized 
knowledge valuable to one of the intelligence agencies. 
d. The prompt notification of the appropriate 
intelligence agency concerning any of the elements 
mentioned above. 
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CHAPTER 4 (CONFIDENTIAL) 
OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES 
24. (CONFIDENTIAL) Sources of Information 
a. (UNCLASSIFIED) General. Many agencies, 
civilian and military, in the zone of the interior and 
in the theater of operations may serve as sources of 
information. 
b. (UNCLASSIFIED) Liaison. In all phases of 
CBR intelligence, liaison with other intelligence 
agencies and technical services is of primary impor-
tance in securing information. 
(1) Purpose of liaison actimti~s. Liaison activ-
ities are designed to make intelligence and 
information of CBR significance available 
to appropriate Chemical Corps agencies. 
(2) Contacts. Effective liaison activities depend 
in large measure upon the ingenuity and 
acumen of Chemical Corps personnel 
charged with CBR intelligence functions. 
In general, effective and informative con-
tacts must be established with the following 
groups whenever possible: 
(a) Military intelligence. Close liaison should 
be maintained with intelligence staff sec-
tions at all levels of command to secure 
the tactical or combat intelligence re-
quired for effective employment of 
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Chemical Corps units, to gain introduc-
tion to new sources of CBR information, 
to ascertain the location of and gain 
access to CBR intelligence targets, and 
to arrange for prisoner-of-war interroga-
tions. 
(b) Technical intelligence coordinators. Tech-
nical intelligence coordinators are nor-
mally assigned to the field army under 
prov1s10ns of TOE 30-15, Military 
Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. 
They assist the technical services in 
obtaining enemy technical documents 
and in prisoner-of-war interrogations re-
la ting to materiel for which they are 
responsible. The technical intelligence 
coordinator also assists in obtaining 
items of captured materiel in which CBR 
intelligence personnel are interested but 
for which another technical service has 
the primary responsibility. 
(c) Other technical services. Close liaison, 
with appropriate level G2 coordination, 
must be maintained at all times and at 
all echelons with the intelligence elements 
of the other technical services to effect 
constant interchange of information and 
to develop new sources of information 
through targets located by intelligence 
elements of the other services. 
(d) Higher, lower, and adjacent units. For 
proper functioning and maximum eff ec-
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tiveness of CBR intelligence activities, 
there must be free and rapid interchange 
of information at all levels of command 
and in all directions. Lower echelons 
must forward all pertinent information to 
higher echelons as speedily as possible 
without sacrificing full local exploitation. 
Higher commands must keep all lower 
echelons fully informed of important 
intelligence developments and must as-
sist in maintaining current the essential 
elements of information required of each 
unit. 
(e) Navy and Air Force. Every effort should 
be made to exchange CBR information 
with the other services. 
(f) Allied armed forces intelligence agencies. 
Under certain conditions, and for certain 
types of information, communication with 
intelligence agencies of the armed forces 
of allied nations can be accomplished 
through theater G2. 
(g) United States civilian intelligence agencies. 
By arrangement through G2, normally at 
theater headquarters, liaison may be 
established with all United States civilian 
agencies (operating in the theater) which 
may possess or have access to CBR 
information. Agencies devoted to re-
search and development, civilian chem-
ical and biological research, and technical 
and industrial problems may be included. 
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c. (UNCLASSIFIED) Published Data. 
(1) Information from higher headquarters. In-
formation from higher headquarters may be 
furnished in a variety of forms and may deal 
with many different intelligence problems. 
Documents, surveys, and reports prepared 
within the Department of the Army may 
first be utilized. These include National 
Intelligence Surveys, CBR studies of var-
ious areas, and special reports prepared 
from information and material available 
to the Chief Chemical Officer and the 
Department of the Army. In the same 
category are equivalent reports prepared 
and published by other technical services of 
the Departments of the Army, the Navy, 
and the Air Force. In addition, similar 
surveys and reports prepared by allied 
governments are usually made available to 
the technical service intelligence units of 
the Army. These reports contain informa-
tion dealing with CBR problems in the 
areas covered and often furnish a basic 
background upon which current intelli-
gence operations may be superimposed. 
Of special interest will be certain geo-
graphical considerations, climatology, na-
tural resources, and industries which can 
give a primary understanding of CBR 
potential. Peoples may be better under-
stood by an appreciation of the socio-
economic conditions under which they 
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live, their psychological makeup, and the 
cultural advantages which they enjoy. 
CBR capabilities may best be understood 
by a consideration of the industrial poten-
tial; numbers and training of scientists; 
numbers, sizes, and types of laboratories, 
experimental stations, and testing facilities; 
and the activities of chemical, biological 
and physical science associations and organ-
izations. Information concerning labora-
tories, industrial establishments, educa-
tional institutions, and research founda-
tions specializing in CBR and related fields 
will have particular CBR intelligence value. 
(2) Chemical, biological, radiological, and related 
technical publications. Information is found 
in a diverse group of chemical and technical 
publications which may be available in mil-
itary and civilian facilities both in the zone 
of the interior and in a theater of operations. 
These publications may include books, 
journals, monographs, maps, statistical re-
ports, yearbooks, publications of research 
institutes, and industrial and trade papers. 
They cover a variety of subjects and often 
provide much detniled information. How-
ever, since some of the material from these 
sources may be outdated, liaison with mili-
tary intelligence and with the intelligence 
sections of other technical services must be 
maintained to secure all current informa-
tion. Previous publications may often be 
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brought up to date by careful questioning 
of individuals recently sojourning in areas 
under consideration, especially if these per-
sons have had chemical or other technical 
training. 
d. (UNCLASSIFIED) Enemy Order of Battle. A 
careful analysis of all enemy order of battle reports 
dealing with the chemical service may permit the 
development of a fairly comprehensive study of en-
emy CBR organization, supply training, and capa-
bilities. In addition, some knowledge may be gained 
of the basis on which chemical units and personnel 
are assigned to enemy forces. 
e. (UNCLASSIFIED) Prisoner-o..f-Wa,r Interroga-
tion. Interrogation of prisoners of war is a.n impor-
tant and difficult task whose techniques must be ac-
quired through careful training (FM 30-15). Al-
though interrogators must be trained in interroga-
tion techniques, it is equally important that they 
have an adequate knowledge of the subject they are 
to explore in questioning prisoners of war. Chemical 
Staff officers may recommend EEI to the G2, which 
will be disseminated as specified orders or requests 
to interrogators of prisoners of war concerning spe-
cific CBR items of equipment, activities, materiel 
or installations and facilities. Selected Chemical 
Corps intelligence personnel should be trained in 
POW interrogation procedures. With the knowledge 
and assistance of appropriate G2 agencies, qualified 
Chemical Corps intelligence personnel will be fur-
nished upon request to assist IPW units in the inter-
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rogation of knowledgeable prisoners of war (par. 
14b(6) ). 
(I) Chemical service prisoners. Prisoners of war 
from enemy chemical services should be in-
terrogated by IPW units with the assistance 
of Chemical Corps intelligence personnel. 
Information to be obtained from enemy 
chemical service personnel includes CBR pro-
cedures and techniques, special CBR prob-
lems currently in evidence or anticipated, 
current immunization procedures, antigas 
precautions, and evidence indicating the 
possibility of the introduction of disease-
producing organisms or vectors of disease, 
and chemical, incendiary, or radiological 
agents as instruments of warfare. In every 
case where the prisoner gives evidence of 
highly specialized knowledge, the assistance 
of additional qualified personnel, from the 
Chemical Corps or other technical services, 
should be sought to obtain maximum bene-
fit. 
(2) Other enemy scientific personnel. Additional 
information of a similar nature, less detailed 
but often very informative, may be obtained 
by routine questioning of all enemy civilian 
scientific and professional personnel en-
countered in occupied areas. 
f. (CONFIDENTIAL) Captured Documents and 
Materiel. CBR intelligence personnel are responsible 
for investigations and primary evaluation of captured 
enemy CBR materiel for intelligence purposes. 
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Every effort should be made to secure representative 
samples of materiel from the enemy installation 
where found rather than to wait for eventual re-
moval of the bulk supplies to chemical or other 
depots. 
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( 1) (UN CLASSIFIED) Captured documents. 
All captured documents of CBR intelligence 
value will be handled as prescribed in FM 
30-15. When examined systematically by 
competent personnel, captured documents 
are often valuable sources of information on 
enemy organization and order of battle; 
types, characteristics and specifications of 
equipment; manpower and manpower re-
serves; training standards and procedures; 
special CBR problems, technical proce-
dures, and supply. Any and all documents 
are utilized that deal with the structure 
and function of the enemy chemical service, 
the troop basis on which chemical personnel 
and units are supplied, the operation of the 
enemy chemical service, and civilian CBR 
problems, resources and capabilities. 
(2) (CONFIDENTIAL) Captured materiel. 
1tems of enemy materiel and equipment 
which are novel and apparently of CBR 
intelligence value should be fully investi-
gated. Special attention should be directed 
toward the discovery of any equipment or 
materiel suggestive of the study of CBR 
agents as weapons of warfare. Valuable 
intelligence about the quantity and quality 
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of enemy CBR supplies and enemy produc-
tion capabilities can be developed from 
examination of common chemicals and other 
items, including their containers, and by 
making note of all factory addresses, trade-
marks, special identifying symbols, inspec-
tion stamps or markings, and dates of 
manufacture. 
(3) (UNCLASSIFIED) Safeguarding captured 
materiel and documents. 
(a) Individual responsibilities. All individ-
uals in the Army and all those attached 
for duty with its forces are responsible 
for promptly turning in or reporting the 
presence of captured materiel to the com-
manding officer of their own or nearest 
unit. The theater commander may 
exempt certain items from this procedure. 
(b) Unit commander's responsibilities. All 
unit commanders are responsible for 
insuring that captured materiel in their 
zone of action or operations is properly 
safeguarded, reported to the G2 of their 
own or of the next higher command, 
promptly turned over to the interested 
technical service, or left in position if 
immediate use or destruction is not neces-
sary (FM 30-16). 
( 4) (UN CLASSIFIED) Processing of captured 
documents and materiel. 
(a) Objectives. The four principal objectives 
in the handling of captured enemy CBR 
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items are: prompt development of coun-
terweapons and countertactics with spe-
cial reference to enemy intentions in the 
use of CBR agents as instruments of war; 
prompt exploitation of new ideas in CBR 
techniques or materiel for our own bene-
fit; early deductions as to the state of 
enemy resources in CBR supply and 
equipment; and use by our own forces of 
enemy CBR materiel, including litera-
ture and other aids to assist in training. 
(b) Responsibilities. In order to make full 
use of the limited specialist personnel 
available, responsibility for the achieve-
ment of the above objectives is divided 
between Chemical Detachments (Tech-
nical Intelligence) and supply sections, 
as outlined in paragraphs 12 and 15. 
g. (UNCLASSIFIED) Enemy Civilian Personnel. 
The nature of CBR problems and of the type of 
information which may be useful makes it desirable 
that specially qualified enemy civilians working in 
chemistry, biology, radiology, or the allied sciences 
be thoroughly interrogated. Such individuals may 
furnish valuable information on the status of enemy 
research and development, manufacturing processes 
and items being produced, disease incidence, vac-
cines and antibiotics developed to combat diseases, 
size and location of stockpiles, and psychological 
and morale factors among civilians. In addition, 
they may furnish vital information about intelli-
gence targets or conditions within enemy forces, 
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in ·which case the appropriate S2 or G2 should be 
notified. 
h. (UNCLASSIFIED) Enemy Civilian CBR Fa-
cilities. Laboratories, universities, research centers, 
manufacturing plants, and special facilities are 
valuable sources of CBR information and should be 
thoroughly investigated and exploited whenever · 
possible. 
25. (UNCLASSIFIED) Tactical Essential Elements 
of Information 
a,. General. The principal objective for CBR 
intelligence personnel and units during field opera-
tions is to furnish sufficient CBR intelligence to 
allow maximum effective planning and execution 
of CBR operations. To accomplish this goal, · 
intelligence activities are divided into three phases: 
planning, combat, and post-combat. The intelli-
gence requirements of each of these phases differ 
in many respects. Therefore, a standard CBR 
EEI (essential elements of information) will be com-
posed of the following: 
b. The Planning Phase. The essential elements of 
information required for the proper planning of 
CBR support for a combat operation include military 
and CBR intelligence dealing with conditions under 
which the operation will take place and the effect 
of these conditions upon our own troops. Specifi-
cally, the EEI are as follows: 
(1) CBR surveys of the areas of projected 
operations to indicate terrain and climatic 
features which may influence troop opera-
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tions in CBR warfare. Such surveys may 
indicate the imminence of CBR warfare 
and the problems which must be solved 
to assure maintenance of the maximum 
effective strength of our own troops. 
(2) Order of battle (enemy strength and dis-
positions) and capabilities of resistance 
to our forces. 
(3) New CBR weapons, with their capabilities 
and the need for protective measures and 
special treatment for casualties. 
(4) Enemy use of any special immunizing 
procedures to protect their personnel against 
BWagents. 
(5) Terrain and enemy installations of all 
types, for use in planning the location of 
chemical installations and lines of evacua-
tion. 
(6) Condition and loca.tion of transporta.tion 
facilities. 
(7) Possible laboratory sites in pre-existing 
facilities. 
(8) Communications facilities. 
c. The Combat Phase. During combat the rapidly 
changing tactical situation requires additional ac-
tivity in making proper disposition of units and 
CBR supplies to best support the contemplated 
action, and to afford necessary protection to troops 
in areas recently taken from the enemy. The essen-
tial elements of information required under these 
conditions include the following: 
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(1) Enemy strength, capability of resistance, 
and locations of CBR units. 
(2) Detailed information on areas in the path 
of the projected advance, particularly 
CBR intelligence targets, possibilities, and 
problems. 
(3) The status of enemy CBR equipment and 
supplies, including any new equipment 
which might be used by our own forces. 
(4) Information necessary to keep current the 
intelligence material furnished during the 
planning phase. 
(5) Continuation of all possible inquiries into 
enemy potentialities for employment of 
unorthodox methods of warfare, including 
the use of any special immunizing pro-
cedures designed to protect enemy per-
sonnel against BW agents that would in-
dicate the need for special measures to in-
sure protection of our personnel. 
d. Post-Combat Phase. The essential elements of 
information required during the post-combat phase 
properly include not only data outlined above, which 
may be secured by investigation and interrogation, 
but also full exploitation of captured CBR informa-
tion and resources. In both instances it is essential 
to insure full and rapid exploitation and utilization 
of all CBR information which may be of value in 
future operations or which is required by CBR 
research and development agencies. 
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26. (UNCLASSIFIED) Technical Essential Ele-
ments of Information 
In addition to those factors influencing chemical 
service operations mentioned previously, the follow-
ing technical EEI are included in the CBR intelli-
gence plan: 
a. Details of new or improved CBR materiel, in-
cluding supplies, chemicals, antibiotics, chemothera-
peutic agents, insecticides, biologicals, and instru-
ments as designed and used by the enemy, together 
with an estimation of the possibility of their use by 
our o-wn forces. 
b. Chemical supplies and equipment, including 
quantities, methods of packaging, and instructions 
which may indicate amounts of the supplies avail-
able. The disappearance of certain standard items 
from the supplies normally found with chemical 
units gives prompt indication of items in short 
supply. l\1ethods of packaging and labeling may 
also serve to indicate shortages by indicating that 
certain materials are to be used only for certain 
purposes, with substitutes otherwise utilized. 
c. Composition, packaging, and labeling of CBR 
materials, with (especially) their quality and avail-
ability. 
d. Careful investigation of all possible sources, 
locations, laboratories, research institutions, and 
available personnel for evidences of the emplo,yment 
of CBR materials as agents of warfare. 
e. Careful scrutiny of all supplies and stores of 
biologicals, vaccines, serums, and related products 
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for new items or preparations possibly intended for 
BW use. 
j. Surveys of all enemy documents, publications, 
and field orders for possible information on enemy 
CBR supply and mate::-iel resources and potentialities. 
g. Check of sources mentioned above for informa-
tion on new discoveries or techniques, or improve-
ments on existing methods in CBR or allied sciences. 
h. Detailed interrogation of selected enemy pris-
oners of war to obtain further details on information 
desired. 
27. (UNCLASSIFIED) Special Operations 
Special operations, primarily those planned for 
arctic or tropical areas, require only the essential 
elements of information previously described. How-
ever, it is the task of Chemical Corps personnel to 
anticipate the importance of certain information 
necessary for successful operations in these areas. 
Special emphasis is placed on the effects of climato-
logical factors upon CBR agents in combat opera-
tions. 
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CHAPTER 5 (UNCLASSIFIED) 
RECORDS AND REPORTS 
28. Records 
a. Purpose. Records and reports are used for the 
systematic arrangement of all information in order 
to facilitate its evaluation and use by all agencies 
and to allow rapid and accurate dissemination. 
b. Methods of Recording. In general, methods of 
recording information are in accordance with theater 
directives but must be adapted to the needs of the 
individual unit and service. Proper and prompt 
dissemination of intelligence is of primary impor-
tance; records are a secondary consideration. 
c. Standard Records. Following the initial exami-
nation, each item of information must be recorded 
so as to facilitate reference and study. The item 
may be recorded in an accession sheet, a daily 
journal, a worksheet, a situation map, a target folder, 
or in any or all combinations of these. Selection of 
the types of records to be kept by a specific chemical 
unit depends upon the need for the information they 
will contain. Simplification is desirable. 
(1) Accession sheet. The accession sheet is a. 
continuous record of all documents, papers, 
and reports received in the chemical intelli-
gence unit. Material is listed in the order 
of its receipt. Each document or report is 
given an identifying number which appears 
CONFIDENTIAL 
CONFIDENTIAL 
on the accession sheet and on the document 
itself if it is to be retained in the intelligence 
files. The accession sheet also contains the 
date of receipt of the item, its source, sub-
ject, and disposition. If the report is filed, 
the file number is recorded; if it is forwarded, 
the destination is recorded. 
(2) Journal. The journal contains briefs of 
important conferences, records of any action 
taken by the unit or its personnel, and 
similar matters pertaining to the intelligence 
section. The journal may be kept in 
synopsis form and is a permanent record. 
The journal is closed daily, and a copy is 
made available for consolidation with other 
journals of the headquarters. The form of 
the journal may be designated by the 
appropriate headquarters, or it may follow 
the form prescribed in FM 101-5 ·and 
FM 30-5. 
(3) CBR intelligence worksheet. A CBR intelli-
gence worksheet is designed primarily to 
consolidate, as received, all items on a 
particular subject. Worksheets are main-
tained on special pro bl ems for the purpose 
of preparing daily intelligence summaries 
and reports. The information on the work-
sheet, though not necessarily chronological, 
groups all items related to a particular 
subject. The worksheet is temporary and 
not a part of the permanent record (FM 
30-5). 
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(4) Situation map. The situation map, as em-
ployed in CBR intelligence, is designed to 
indicate graphically those details of the 
intelligence situation vital to the proper 
conduct of offensive and defensive CBR 
operations. The map shows as much of 
the pertinent elements of the tactical situa-
tion as is necessary. Enemy headquarters, 
installations and supply depots of interest, 
as well as CBR intelligence targets, may be 
shown. Ordinarily, it is more desirable to 
indicate changing information on overlays, 
maintained daily, rather than on a perma-
nent map. 
(5) Target folders. Folders or files should be 
maintained on all potential CBR intelli-
gence targets in the projected area of oper-
ations. All pertinent information on any 
one target may then be filed in the appro-
priate folder as received. By the time the 
target is available for exploitation, sufficient 
background data will have been amassed to 
facilitate final investigation and evaluation. 
d. Files. In addition to maintaining records, it 
may be necessary to employ a filing plan suitable 
for cataloging all CBR intelligence information, es-
pecially that required for future use. An appropriate 
filing system also facilitates comparison and evalu-
ation of information and dissemination of intelligence. 
Any systematic filing system may be employed 
which makes information readily available. At 
higher command levels, the use of a filing system 
" 
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patterned after that used in the Chemical Corps 
Intelligence Agency, Department of the Army, 
Washington 25, D. C., is recommended. Information 
about the system is available on request. 
29. Reports 
a. General. CBR intelligence is of value only 
when made available sufficiently in advance to allow 
individuals or units concerned to utilize it fully. 
Each item should be carefully examined by a quali-
fied officer or noncommissioned officer to determine 
its nature, urgency, and proper dissemination within 
the organization and to higher, lower, and adjacent 
units, G2, and the technical intelligence coordinator. 
The method of dissemination should be in accord 
with the importance or urgency of the information. 
All dissemination should be recorded in the daily 
journal. To keep the record complete, copies of 
reports sent out should, if possible, be attached to the 
daily journal. 
b. Responsibility. Responsibility for the prepara-
tion of suitable reports on CBR intelligence investi-
gations, interrogations, and other activities rests with 
the individuals or units who have carried out the 
specific assignments. Reports cover examinations 
of enemy equipment, CBR supplies, and materiel; 
examination and translation of captured enemy 
documents; investigation_of CBR intelligence targets; 
and detailed interrogation of prisoners of war and 
other specially qualified enemy civilian or military 
personnel. 
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c. Elements of Reports. The form of a CBR intelli-
gence report depends in large measure upon the sub-
ject of the report and the method used to obtain the 
information. To insure maximum utility, however, 
all reports should contain certain specific data. It is 
essential to include sufficient background details 
on the individual, place, or item under investigation 
to enable the recipient of the report to gain an ade-
quate understanding of the purposes of the investi-
gation. In addition, these details will assist in 
evaluating the information. The investigator pre-
paring the report should include his personal esti-
mate of the source and the reliability of the report. 
Reports should be as detailed as possible; separate 
reports on different subjects from the same source 
may be necessary for brevity and clarity (app. II). 
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d. 1llethods of Reporting. 
(1) Personal contact. It is frequently possible 
for CBR intelligence to be transmitted 
directly in person or by telephone to those 
immediately concerned. vVhere necessary, 
urgent information may be dispatched by 
special messenger. 
(2) Conferences. Exchange of information is 
facilitated by frequent conferences between 
individuals concerned. To make full and 
immediate use of current intelligence, it is 
desirable, especially at higher levels, that 
intelligence personnel confer frequently 
with appropriate staff members. These. 
conferences are particularly useful since 
they give other individuals full opportunity 
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to outline new and current essential ele-
ments of information based on the changing 
tactical situation and intelligence previously 
received. In turn, this insures that the 
intelligence section is fully cognizant of all 
the requirements of the headquarters and 
will anticipate future needs. 
(3) Periodic report. A periodic report or sum-
mary, briefly outlining the important infor-
mation of the day, may be prepared for 
distribution among authorized personnel of 
the chemical section, to other technical 
intelligence services, and to G2. A sum-
mary is issued only if required by head-
quarters and if the information warrants 
such dissemination. The periodic report 
may cover any given period, and may be 
issued as required. 
(4) CBR intelligence summaries. CBR intelli-
gence summaries are prepared as authori-
tative and accurate reviews or summaries 
of any information available on a special 
topic and phase of CBR intelligence. An 
example of a summary prepared during the 
planning phase of an operation might be a 
CBR survey of the area of projected opera-
tion. During the combat phase, a sum-
mary might be prepared on the status of 
enemy CBR supply or the types of protec-
tive clothing and devices issued to enemy 
troops. Summaries should deal with cur-
rent problems and should attempt to fur-
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nish sufficient information to give a true 
picture of the enemy's plans, capabilities, 
or intentions. In addition, technical sum-
maries on speGial items of enemy equipment 
may be issued. These summaries will be 
devoted to new and unusual items of equip-
ment particularly suitable for use by 
friendly forces. Organization and equip-
ment of enemy chemical units and the basis 
of their assignment should be reviewed 
frequently, and kept current in appropriate 
summaries. 
(5) Special reports. Reports on special or emer-
gency situations may be prepared as re-
quired for authorized persons, agencies 
or headquarters. Reports on evidence of 
enemy attempts to use CBR agents offen-
sively will be included in this category. 
All information of this nature will be treated 
with the utmost urgency. Details of the 
suspected incident will be transmitted by 
the most expeditious means available, con-
sistent with security, to the chemical officer 
and G2 of the command concerned so that 
prompt and full evaluation may be made 
and prompt countermeasures instituted. 
e. Dissemination. 
(1) Reports of all investigations of CBR intelli-
gence targets, equipment, materiel, docu-
ments, and personnel will be forwarded 
promptly to the staff chemical officer of the 
headquarters to which the CD(TI) is as-
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signed or attached. When deemed desir-
able, copies of these reports may be 
furnished directly to commanders or S2's 
of units in the immediate vicinity or adja-
cent to the investigation, especially where 
such action may be of assistance to local 
units. 
(2) All staff reports prepared by staff chemical 
sections, or received by them from investi-
gating detachments, should be made avail-
able to the chemical officer and G2 of the 
next higher command. Copies may also 
be sent, as necessary, to the intelligence 
units of other technical services. 
(3) In addition to the local dissemination de-
scribed above, all CBR intelligence reports 
processed through technical channels are 
forwarded to higher commands in accord-
ance with current instructions. Informa-
tion copies of appropriate reports prepared 
at army leve] are sent to army group or 
communications zone headquarters if desir-
able, but are, in any case, forwarded to the 
command designated by the theater com-
mander. 
(4) Appropriate CBR intelligence material pre-
pared in the theater should be transmitted 
promptly to the Department of the Army 
for such use and additional dissemination 
as may be required. This policy applies 
particularly to technical summaries on 
enemy CBR equipment and techniques. 
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CHAPTER 6 (UNCLASSIFIED) 
SECURITY 
30. Security Functions of Chemical Corps Technical 
Intelligence Units 
a. Objective. Supplementing operational security 
requirements for safeguarding personnel and prop-
erty, additional responsibilities are imposed by the 
necessity of safeguarding from loss or compromise all 
that military information which is or should be 
classified in the interest of national defense, or pre-
serving the security of military operations. 
b. Responsibilities. While the Chief of Staff, 
United States Army exercises control over all 
policies relating to the security of such classified 
information, the direct responsibility for common-
sense application of all prescribed basic safeguards 
rests upon both the commander and each individual 
who is in a physical position to exercise direct 
security control over classified documents, com-
munications, or materiel. 
50 
c. Application. 
(1) The protection of classified matter must be 
an integral part of each task and ideally is 
never an additionally imposed burden. 
Chemical Corps units, through sound 
direction by their responsible officers and 
alert performance of duty by all sub-
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ordinates, must achieve the desired balance 
between the requirement(s) for absolute 
security of classified information and the 
requirement for a relatively unhampered 
flow of intelligence information to insure 
the success of assigned missions. 
(2) Scope, methods, and procedures prescribed 
by the Department of the Army may 
change from time to time. They are pub-
lished principally in AR 380-series, of 
which AR 380-5 is the basic document. 
They may be augmented through supple-
mentary instructions, published as needed 
by the commanders primarily responsible. 
Chemical Corps personnel are responsible 
as individuals for becoming familiar with, 
and applying, the instructions as they are 
published. 
31. Specialized Security Responsibilities 
Aside from the commander's operational re-
sponsibilities, security discipline in Chemical Corps 
units, as in other units of the Army establishment, is 
primarily individual in nature. The usual con-
siderations are physical security, movement secur-
ity, safeguarding classified defense information 
including the prompt reporting of observed breaches 
of security, visitor control, the suppression of care-
less of irresponsible talk, counterintelligence, and an 
awareness of Special Warfare operations. Specific 
support missions will be assigned, and guidance 
provided, by competent authority. 
CONFIDENTIAL 11 
CONFIDENTIAL 
32. Event of Capture 
All Chemical Corps personnel will be instructed 
of their rights and responsibilities as prisoners of 
war. An understanding of the reasoning developed 
in the U. S. Fighting Man's Code (DA Pam 21-71) 
is essential to the individual's ability to survive and 
to render continued military service after capture. 
Every soldier must adhere to the provisions of the 
Code and give only his name, grade, service number, 
and date of birth in the event of capture. 
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CHAPTER 7 (UNCLASSIFIED) 
TRAINING 
33. Purpose 
The purpose of training Chemical Corps personnel 
in military intelligence is to insure the efficient per-
formance of intelligence functions by both officer 
and enlisted personnel. It is of paramount im-
portance to instill in all Chemical Corps personnel an 
appreciation of their individual intelligence obliga-
tion. How this is to be accomplished depends to a 
large extent upon the imagination and initiative of 
unit commanders and chemical staff officers. 
34. Scope 
Intelligence training at all kvels of command in-
cludes appropriate instruction in the collection, 
recording, evaluation, and interpretation of informa-
tion in military intelligence; in the dissemination and 
application of CBR intelligence; and in the proper 
planning and application of counterintelligence to 
assist commanders at all levels to plan and execute 
offensive and defensive CBR operations in further-
ance of the command mission. 
35. Responsibility 
a. Chemical Corps Un'it Commanders. In the 
Chemical Corps unit, CBR intelligence is produced 
to enable the commander to perform his mission 
properly. Therefore, all commanders must under-
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stand the need for and the methods of obtaining such 
intelligence. Intelligence training is the responsi-
bility of the commander, who will insure that all 
Chemical Corps personnel of his command under-
stand and can adequately perform their intelligence 
duties. 
b. Staff Chemical 0.ffecers. The Staff Chemical 
officer of a major command may have a subsection 
of his office devoted to intelligence functions. These 
functions are his responsibility, and related operations 
are carried out under the general staff coordination 
of G2. The chemical staff officer is responsible for 
the proper implementation and supervision of CBR 
intelligence training within subordinate commands 
in compliance with established training directives. 
36. Relationships 
The chemical officer at each level of command 
must cooperate and coordinate w-ith 02 of the com-
mand to provide adequate instruction and training 
in intelligence matters. CBR intelligence portions 
of the unit training program are coordinated with 
G2, but the execution of the program is supervised 
by the chemical officer. Intelligence training should 
be integrated with other types of training when the 
total value of the training will be enhanced by the 
combination. 
37. Personnel 
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a. Chemical Corps Personnel. 
(1) All Chemical Corps personnel are potential 
collectors of military information including 
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CBR intelligence information anct must, 
therefore, be trained in collecting and report-
ing such i~formation. Each should be able 
to observe and report enemy attitude, 
CBR equipment or protective devices, and 
information about the use or contemplated 
use of CBR agents as weapons. 
(2) The only valid limitation upon the scope of 
reports is the inability of the individual to 
see, think, remember, or transmit his obser-
vations, evaluations, or conclusions. 
(3) Since chemical service installations in the 
combat zone may indicate tactical distribu-
tion of troops, it is essential that all Chemi-
cal Corps personnel receive instruction 
and training in counterintelligence. 
b. Chemical Corps Intelligence Officers and En-
listed Personnel. Chemical Corps personnel who 
perform specific CBR intelligence functions at higher 
levels of command will receive specialized instruc-
tion and training in military and chemical subjects. 
This instruction will normally cover CBR materiel, 
equipment, literature, and documents; enemy CBR 
tactics and doctrine; climatic and terrain features 
which may influence CBR warfare operations; 
interrogation of knowledget1,ble enemy prisoners of 
,var on CBR and related topics; and the preparation, 
and submission of required intelligence reports 
surveys, memoranda, or special studies. 
c. Chemical Detachments (Technical Intelligence). 
(CD(TI)'s), (TOE 3-500R), in addition to the 
subjects outlined in b above, will receive detailed 
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instruction in collection, evaluation, and disposition 
of CBR materiel and equipment of all types (FM 
30-16). 
38. Methods of Instruction 
Instruction methods prescribed by FM 21-5 
apply to all phases of military intelligence training. 
Such training is best carried out in centralized 
training units or military schools. During all its 
phases, the program should include individual, unit, 
and combined training in the field. 
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CHAPTER 8 (UNCLASSIFIED) 
CBR INTELLIGENCE IN ZONE OF THE 
INTERIOR 
39. Mission 
The current mission of the Chemical Corps Intel-
ligence Agency is to serve the CBR intelligence needs 
(except counterintelligence) of the Department of the 
Army and the Chemical Corps (par. 5). 
40. Functions 
The functions of the Chemical Corps Intelligence 
Agency may be summarized under two headings: 
intelligence and training. 
a. Intelligence . . 
(1) Collection and dissemination. 
(a) Directs the CBR intelligence collection 
effort and disseminates detailed informa-
tion and intelligence from all possible 
sources on CBR supplies, production, 
research, and resources, and on related 
activities for all areas outside the conti-
nental United States to meet Chemical 
Corps and Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel-
ligence, Department of the Army require-
ments. 
(b) Exercises staff supervision of certain 
CD (Tl) units in the ZI. 
(c) Coordinates CBR intelligence with other 
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members of the intelligence community 
in the ZI and with the DA Army Staff. 
(d) :Maintains a systematic file of all docu-
ments and other materials collected to 
insure availability and rapid dissemina-
tion when required. 
(e) Acts in an advisory capacity to Assistant 
Chief of Staff, Intelligence and all ele-
ments of the Chemical Corps on CBR 
intelligence and related matters. 
(2) Production of intelligence. 
(a) Analyzes, evaluates, and interprets the 
information collected and prepares and 
submits for publication as needed regular 
and special reports or surveys on matters 
listed in (l)(a) above. 
(b) Prepa.res CBR surveys on various areas 
of strategic and tactical importance re-
quired by the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
Intelligence, US Army, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
(c) Reviews published surveys and adds cur-
rent information as it becomes available 
in order to incorporate new information, 
and keep surveys up-to-date. 
b. Training Responsibilities. 
(1) Develops techniques for and assists in 
developing CBR intelligence training pro-
grams and materials. 
(2) Exercises staff supervision over the pre-
assignment training in the ZI of Chemical 
Corps intelligence personnel and units. 
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APPENDIX I (UNCLASSIFIED) 
REFERENCES 
DA Pam 320-1 
DA Pam 380-5 
DA Pam 380-55 
DA Pam 380-series 
DA Pam 381-25 (C) 
DA Pam 381-220= (C) 
SR 320-5-1 
FM 3-9 
F:'.\I 9-40 
FlVI 19-30 
FM 19-40 
FM 21--10 
FM 30-5 (0) 
F1I 30-15 
F:M 30-16 (C) 
DA Pam 21-71 
DA Pam 30-12-1 (S) 
Dictionary of U. S. Army Terms for 
Joint Usage. 
Military Security-Safeguarding De-
fense Information. 
Military Security-Safeguarding De-
fense Information-Movement of 
Persons and Things. 
Military Security-as required. 
Military Intelligence-Army Intelli-
gence Collection Instructions (U). 
Foreign Materiel for Intelligence Pur-
poses (U). 
Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms. 
Staff Chemical Officer. 
Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance 
and Disposal. 
Physical Security of Military and In-
dustrial Installations. 
Handling Prisoners of War. 
Defense Against CBR Attack. 
Combat Intelligence. 
Examination of Personnel and Docu-
ments. 
Technical Intelligence (U). 
The U.S. Fighting Man's Code. 
Foreign Military Wea pons and Equip-
ment, Vol. VIII: Chemical Equip· 
ment, Sec. I USSR (U). 
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DA Pam 30-12-2 (S) Foreign Military Weapons and Equip-
ffent, Chemical Equipment, Sec. II 
Sino-Soviet Bloc (Less USSR) (U). 
DA Pam 30-14-1 (S) Foreign Military Weapons and Equip-
ment, Vol. X: Ammunition (Sec. I 
USSR) (U). 
DA Pam 30-26 A Guide to the Collection of Technical 
Intelligence. 
TOE 3-500R Chemical Service Organizations. 
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APPENDIX II (CONFIDENTIAL) 
CBR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
REPORTS 
Page 
Form 1- Outline, Foreign Materiel Technical Report 
(FMTR) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 62 
Form 2-Outline, Captured Materiel Technical Report 
(CMTR) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _____ _ ___ __ _ ___ ___ 65 
Form 3-Outline, Technical Intelligence Target Report 
(TITR) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 68 
Form 4-Outline, Foreign Materiel Evaluation Report 
(FMER) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 70 
Example 1-Mechanical Requirements, CBR Techni-
cal Intelligence Reports (all)_________ 71 
Example 2-Format, Title and Signature Pages, Tech-
nical Intelligence Reports (all)________ 72 
Example 3-(CONFIDENTIAL) Captured Materiel 
Technical Report (C MTR) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 4 
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Form 1 (UNCLASSIFIED) FOREIGN MATE-
RIEL TECHNICAL REPORT (FMTR) 
REPORT OUTLINE 
(All headings shown below, with appropriate 
numbers and letters, should appear in the report. 
The omission of text under any heading should be 
explained.) 
I. ABSTRACT: 
Prepare a brief general synopsis of the report, 
covering as many of the significant points listed 
below as practicable. "Authorization" and "Items 
To Be Examined" should be omitted, but the object 
of the work should be stated. 
II. AUTHORIZATION: 
Reference any correspondence directly concerning 
sample. Ordinarily a job number under a miscel-
laneous project should be obtained to cover the 
examination. 
III. ITEM TO BE EXAMINED: 
In a general statement, reference any available 
reports on examination of the item by other agencies 
and any military intelligence reports concerning it. 
Any data or well-founded assumptions on use or 
issue (actual or intended) may be included here. 
IV. PHYSICAL, CHE}v.lICAL, AND PHYSI-
OLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
This section should be subdivided in an appropriate 
manner, marking the main subdivisions "A, B, C," 
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and so on, and the next subdivisions "1, 2, 3," 
and so on. The nature of these subdivisions will 
vary according to the item reported on, and may 
best be determined by reference to issued FMTR's 
on objects in the same general class. Subdivisions 
may be changed as necessary. 
V. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Describe operation of the item. 
VI. TACTICAL USE: 
A precise analysis is not required here, but a 
general statement of probable use should be made. 
VII. COMPARISON WITH COMPARABLE U.S. 
EQUIP1.v.IENT: 
In preparing this section, the following points 
should be considered: 
Compactness 
Weight 
Simplicity of design 
Efficiency 
Simplicity in operation 
Superiority of component parts, either in con-
struction or in materiel used 
The extent to which critical materials are used 
General effectiveness in field use 
VIII. DEDUCTIONS AS TO FOREIGN RE-
SOURCES: 
This section loses much of its significance during 
peacetime when only deductions indicating unusual 
conditions should be mentioned. 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
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The following points should be covered: 
Desirable features, if any, to be incorporated in 
U. S. materiel. 
Counteragents. These recommendations, if any, 
should be of a general nature and should refer 
to a counteragent for the group to which the 
examined object belongs, rather than to a 
counteragent for only one item. 
Need for further tests, field trials, or surveillance. 
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Form 2 (UNCLASSIFIED) CAPTURED MATE-
RIEL TECHNICAL REPORT (CMTR) 
REPORT OUTLINE 
(The numbers and letters used for the several 
headings shown below should be used in the report. 
Irrelevant headings may be omitted.) 
I. ABSTRACT: 
Prepare a brief general synopsis of the report 
covering as many of the significant points listed 
below as practicable. 
II. INTRODUCTION: 
A. Indicate disposition of sample and describe 
means by which sample was forwarded. 
B. Record any previous reports on item or on sim~ 
ilar items. 
III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ITEM: 
A. Circumstances under which item was found. 
B. Give a general description of the item, paying 
special and complete attention to identification 
data. Refer to photos and drawings, or sketches, 
attached. 
IV. PHYSICAL AND/OR CHEMICAL CHAR-
ACTERISTICS: 
A. Checklist should be developed as a guide to the 
necessary content of this paragraph. A sample 
checklist for a chemical agent is-
l. Color 
2. Odor 
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3. Specific gravity 
4. Boiling point 
5. Melting point 
6. Vapor pressure 
7. Chemical reactions 
B. State any conclusions regarding the identity of 
the materiel examined. 
V. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Describe the operation of the item, if a munition 
or item of equipment, and its use, if a toxic agent. 
Information such as duration of functioning, range, 
delay features, physiological effects, and psycho-
logical effects should be included. 
VI. TACTICAL USE: 
State how the item is employed tactically by the 
enemy, i. e., to deny ground1 to harass, or to cause 
casualties. 
VIL COMPARISON WITH U.S. MATERIEL: 
Compare with the most nearly comparable U. S. 
item. Following are points for consideration: 
A. Compactness 
B. Weight 
C. Simplicity of design 
D. Simplicity of operation 
E. Superiority of component parts 
F. General effectiveness in field use- -
VIII. DEDUCTIONS AS TO ENEMY RE-
SOURCES: 
Any statement here should be substantiated with 
all available data. 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
A. Desirable features, if any, which should be 
considered for incorporation in our own devices. 
B. Counterweapons and countertactics as may be 
necessary from field observation. 
C. Need for providing literature and other aids to 
assist in advising commanders on capabilities and 
limitations of enemy materiel and, when required, 
to assist in training troops in the use and mainte-
nance of enemy materiel. 
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Form 3 (UNCLASSIFIED) TECHNICAL IN-
TELLIGENCE TARGET REPORT (TITR) 
REPORT OUTLINE 
(The numbers and letters used for the several 
headings shown below should be used in the report. 
Headings not pertinent may be omitted.) 
I. ABSTRACT: 
Prepare a brief general synopsis of the report 
covering as many of the significant points listed 
below as practicable. 
II. INTRODUCTION: 
A. General statement indicating type of target 
such as: 
1. Industrial plant 
2. Key personnel 
3. Research center 
B. Directive and/or reasons for investigation of 
the target. 
C. Measures being taken to safeguard this target 
for further study and/or potential future use. 
III. DESCRIPTION OF TARGET: 
Including the following in lettered paragraphs: 
A. General description of target 
B. Condition of target 
C. Buildings and equipment 
D. Materials and storage 
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IV. INVESTIGATION OF THE TARGET: 
Bring out sources of information: 
A. Blueprints, flow charts, production processes, 
and other documents. 
B. Descriptive captions for photographs, draw-
ings, diagrams of sketches attached. 
V. GENERAL INFORMATION: 
Give a nontechnical summary of relevant infor-
mation on operation, production, safety devices, and 
stockpiles. 
VI. TECHNICAL INFORMATION: 
The technical aspects, if determined, in operation 
and production processes and chemical, biological, 
or radiological safety features. 
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Form 4 (UNCLASSIFIED) FOREIGN :MA-
TERIEL EVALUATION REPORT (FMER) 
REPORT OUTLINE 
(All headings shown below should appear in the 
report. The omission of text under any heading 
should be explained.) 
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I. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IL PICTURE OF EXPLOITED ITEM 
III. ABSTRACT 
IV. INTRODUCTION 
V. HISTORICAL 
VI. DESCRIPTION (include Lab Reports) 
VII. MARKINGS 
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
IX. DISCUSSION 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
XI. APPENDICES 
Detailed laboratory analysis reports, de-
tailed photographs, bibliography, etc., 
are normally presented in appendices to 
the report. 
Note. FMER is rarely field originated. 
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Example 1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Suggested Mechan-
ical Requirements For Field Originated 
CBR Technical Intelligence Reports 
(CMTR, FMTR, TITR, etc.). 
1. PAPER: Letter size (8 in. x 10}~ in.), if possible 
2. MARGINS: 1 inch on all 4 sides 
3. SPACING: Double-space 
4. PAGINATION: Page one (1) may well be a 
photograph (or drawing) of the item reported on. 
After the first page, the page number is centered 
at the bottom of each page. 
5. PHOTOGRAPHS, DRAWINGS ORT ABLES: 
Are located in the most appropriate section of 
text or appendix. If there are many illustra-
tions, the appendix is the preferred location, but 
not at the sacrifice of continuity. Oversize 
illustrations are not encouraged but may be 
used if justified; fold-in is recommended if im-
portant detail is not damaged. Undersize illus-
trations should be mounted on a blank page of 
standard size. 
6. PARAGRAPHS: Are numbered consecutively 
with Roman numerals. Subparagraphs are 
lettered "A, B, 0". Sub-subparagraphs are 
numbered "1, 2, 3". 
7. FORMAT: See appendix II, examples 2 and 3. 
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Example 2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Suggested Format 
For Field Originated CBR Technical 
Intelligence Reports 
TITLE PAGE: 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
HEADQUARTERS (preparing report) 
(DATE) 
TYPE OF REPORT (e.g., CAPTURED MATE-
RIEL TECHNICAL REPORT) 
REPORT NUMBER: (e. g., 23) (Consecutive num-
ber for control by reporting unit) 
REPORT NAME (Item(s) covered in report) 
Date of Capture or Receipt: (if applicable) 
Location of Reporting Unit: (e. g., Sorim Ni, Korea) 
COPY NUMBER .@2_ of (8) COPIES (Prepare only 
the minimum number required) 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
72 CONFIDENTIAL 
CONFIDENTIAL 
SIGNATURE PAGE: 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
1. CMTR (for example) Number: 23 
2. Unit Name 
3. Approval recommended by officer supervising 
exploitation or work 
4. Approved by OIC of reporting unit 
5. Distribution 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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Example 3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Captured Materiel 
Technical Report (final-field) 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
HEADQUARTERS 
305th CHEMICAL DETACHMENT 
(TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE) 
APO 725 
1 November 1951 
CAPTURED MATERIEL TECHNICAL 
REPORT 
NUMBER 23 
AGGRESSOR IRRITANT SMOKE CANDLE 
Captured 10 October 1951 
LOCATION OF REPORTING UNIT 
SORIM NI, KOREA 
Copy Number 8 of 24 copies 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
Page 1 of 12 Pages 
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(CLASSIFICATION) 
I. ABSTRACT 
The captured aggressor irritant smoke candle is an 
adamsite candle five inches high and five inches in 
diameter, and is very similar in construction and 
function to the now-obsolete United States irritant 
gas candle M2. The aggressor candle is inferior 
to our M2 in that it has a shorter burning time, is 
poorly constructed and is dangerous to handle 
because of sparks and flame emitted upon ignition. 
Its advantages over the U. S. M2 include compact-
ness, a more rapid gas emission, simplicity of con-
struction and a greater smoke density output. 
It is recommended that special precautions be 
taken when handling the aggressor irritant smoke 
candle. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
A. Four of the ten candles were forwarded through 
normal channels to the zone of interior. 
B. These irritant smoke candles are of new type 
and are believed to be those mentioned in Informa-
tion Request No. 1082, GHQ, FECOM. It is also 
believed that these are the same type munitions 
as those used against the 54th Brigade on 3 Oct 
1951 at Thankyow. 
III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ITEM 
A. On 10 Oct 1951 Lt. Col. Shaw, the 28th Div 
CmlO, notified the CO, 305th CD(TI), that the 
28th Div had captured an aggressor depot, located 
2;' miles north of Sorim Ni (coordinates 46024210 
Map Korea 1:25,000). Upon investigation ten 
enemy irritant smoke candles were found. 
B. The aggressor irritant smoke candle is a cylin-
drical can 5 inches high and 5 inches in diameter 
made up of two flanged sheet steel bonnets of equal 
size bolted together with four bolts. The bonnets 
are each 2 ½ inches high and 5 inches in diameter, 
stamped from 20-gauge sheet steel. The bonnets 
are separated by an asbestos gasket and a 30-gauge 
steel disc, which divide the candle into two compart-
ments of equal size. The lower compartment con-
tains a match head-scratcher ignitor, a starter fuel 
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(CLASSIFICATION) 
and a main cake of fuel. The upper compartment 
contains a cake of adamsite (DM), a vent tube which 
joins the two compartments, and a gas outlet port 
shielded by a baffle plate. The exterior is painted 
olive drab, has yellow bar insignia on the top and side, 
and has an instruction label on the side. All in-
terior metal to metal contacts are soldered except 
where the baffle plate is riveted to the upper bonnet. 
See figures 1 and 2. 
IV. PHYSICAL AND/OR CHEMICAL CHAR-
ACTERISTICS 
A. Physical characteristics. 
1. Translation of labels and markings. 
(a) Entire candle: Olive drab (except for 
markings and label) 
(b) Top of candle: One yellow bar signifying 
adamsite smoke. 
( c) Side of candle: One yellow bar signifying 
adamsite smoke. 
,& Inspector's stamp 
11 56 5-13-50 Model No. and 
date of manufacture 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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(CLASSIFICATION) 
Instruction label: 
IRRITANT SMOKE CANDLE 
(ADAMSITE) To operate, take position 
up-wind, remove tape from outlets and 
pull wire, draw wire out quickly and 
stand back. (If not ignited, return wire, 
turn it slightly, and repeat.) CAUTION: 
KEEP AT LEAST 10 FEET FROM 
INFLAMMABLES DURING OPERA-
TION. 
Store in Cool Dry Place 
(d) Bottom: The letter "V" is imprinted on 
the bottom. (Meaning unknown, pos-
sibly the manufacturing plant's symbol.) 
2. Weight. 
Gross weight __________________ (7.81 lbs) 3350g. 
Adamsite_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1410. 7 g. 
Powder (fuel) _________________________ 1290.3 g. 
Match head and starter mix____________ 48.6 g. 
Metal components_____________________ 800.4 g. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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B. Chemical Composition. (Analysis by Analyt-
ical Section, (72d Cml Lab.) 
1. Match head: KC1O3 , SbS, Al and sand. 
2. Starter mixture: Barium Nitrate ____ 44. 2% 
Potassium Chlorate 3. 4% 
Antimony Sulfate__ 2. 1 % 
Aluminum ________ 46. 4% 
Binder (resin type)_ 3. 9% 
3. Fuel mixture: NH4NO3, NH4Cl, Cellulose 
nitrate, powdered limestone. (The 72d 
Cml Lab was unable to analyze the fuel 
mixture quantitatively.) 
4. Top compartment: Adamsite cake with small 
amount of resin binder. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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V. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
A. The candle is ignited by removing all tape from 
the outlets and pulling the pull-wire scratcher. The 
scratcher grates across the match head, causing it 
to ignite and in turn ignite the starter mixture. 
This ignites the top mixture and finally the fuel. 
The hot gasses from the fuel travel through the vent 
tube into the upper compartment and are vented 
across the cake of adamsite by the baffle plate, thus 
vaporizing the adamsite, which is emitted along with 
the smoke. Adamsite in this vapor form is much 
more efficient than in the usual droplet-suspension 
form which is characteristic of other gas generators. 
The adamsite vapor covers a greater area and pene-
trates gas mask canisters more easily. This candle 
is dangerous to store and use around other inflam-
mables because of the sparks and flame it throws 
occasionally during ignition. 
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B. Six of the captured candles were tested in the 
field. The results from each candle were fairly 
uniform. All burning times were from two to three 
minutes. With a 3-mile-per-hour wind the adamsite 
vapor laden smoke stayed together well enough to 
have a harassing effect up to 500 yards. Several 
men wearing US model M9 gas masks walked into 
the thickest parts of the smoke and remained there 
for four minutes with no ill effects. The dirty-
yellow smoke emitted impaired visibility for the 
first 100 yards well enough to conceal a man. Two 
of the candles started with difficulty and a third 
candle showered sparks for six to eight feet upon 
ignition. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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VI. TACTICAL USE 
These candles have been used by the aggressor, 
so far as is known, on only one occasion. This was 
in an action against the British 54th Brigade. In 
this incident, many candles were placed up-wind 
from bunkers and gun emplacements and ignited. 
Several of these candles were actually thrown 40 to 
50 yards after ignition without impairing their oper-
ation. The results obtained from this harassing 
maneuver were fairly good from the aggressor view-
point, due mainly to the surprise factor. The 
brigade's :firepower coordination was disrupted tem-
porarily, resulting in the loss of several positions. 
Had masks been available the use of these. candles 
would probably have been ineffective. 
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VII. COMPARISON WITH U. S. MATERIEL 
This aggressor smoke candle is very similar to the 
now-obsolete U.S. irritant gas candle M2. The two 
are essentially the same in principal and components, 
but the aggressor candle is one inch less in height and 
two inches less in diameter. This compactness is 
advantageous because of the ease of transportation 
in the field and the adaptability to hand-throwing. 
The aggressor candle is more crudely constructed 
than the U.S. model M2 and emits a heavier (dark-
yellow) smoke. The aggressor candle is faster burning 
(two to three minutes as compared to three to five 
minutes), with the consequence that it emits flames 
and sparks violently, thereby endangering personnel 
and causing a fire hazard. 
VIII. DEDUCTIONS AS TO ENEMY RE-
SOURCES 
It appears that the bonnets were machine stamped 
and are quite likely produced in quantity. All other 
component parts were also apparently mass pro-
duced. However, the ten candles mentioned here 
and those used against the 54th Brigade are the only 
ones that have been reported. 
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XI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. This aggressor candle has the desirable features 
of compactness and emission of a dense smoke cloud. 
These qualities could be incorporated in our equip-
ment of this type. 
B. The M9 or equivalent-type gas mask is effec-
tive against these candles. 
C. Troops should be cautioned about the danger 
of igniting these aggressor candles, due to their erratic 
emission of flame and sparks upon ignition. 
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Figure 1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Inclosure No. 1 to CMTR. 
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YELLOW BAN D5 BODY (OLIVE DRAB) 
Figure 2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Inclosure No. 2 to CMTR. 
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APPENDIX III (UNCLASSIFIED) 
COMBAT UNIT CBR REPORTS 
Page 
Form I-Format, Standard Shelling, Mortaring, 
Bombing, and Toxic Report_____________ 88 
Example I-Standard Shelling, Mortaring, Bombing, 
and Toxic Report___________________ 89 
Form 1. Format, Standard Shelling, Mortaring, 
Bombing, and Toxic Report 
SHELREP, MORTREP, BOMREP, TOXREP 
A. FROM (Unit, use current call sign or code name) 
B. POSITION OF OBSERVER (map reference 
preferred; location of a headquarters or im-
portant observation post) 
C. GRID OF MAGNETIC omit for aircraft 
(state which) 
BEARING/AZIMUTH IN (state which) 
DEGREES OR MILS OF (state which) 
FLASH OR SOUND OR 
GROOVE OF SHELL 
D. TIME FROM 
E. TIME TO 
F. AREA SHELLED, MOR- (map reference 
TARED, BOMBED OR in clear) 
CONTAMINATED 
G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MOR-
TARS, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER METHODS 
OF DELIVERY 
88 CONFIDENTIAL 
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H. NATURE OF FIRE (REGIS- maybe 
TRATION, BOMBARD- omitted for 
MENT, HARASSMENT, etc.) aircraft 
I. NUMBER AND TYPE OF SHELLS, BOMBS, 
TOXIC AGENTS, etc. 
J. TIME OF FLASH TO BANG omit for air-
craft. 
optional; may include both 
effects and casualties in the 
K. DAMAGE 
case of toxic attack. 
Note. This report is transmitted by whatever means is 
available and in abbreviated form. See following 
page for example. 
Example 1. Standard Shelling, Mortaring, Bomb-
ing, and Toxic Report. 
TOXREP 
ALFA___ _ ______________ OSCAR PAPA 1 
BRAVO _____ - - - - - __ - - - - - __ - 3654 78 
CHARLIE __________________ GRID AZIMUTH FLASH 
1438 MILS. 
DELTA __________________ 1252 
ECHO ______________________ 1257 
FOXTROT_ _ _____________ 378543 
GOLF ______________________ 2 UNKNOWN 
HOTEL __ ------------------ HARASSMENT 
INDIA _____________________ 18 MUSTARD 
JULIETT ___________________ 3 SECONDS 
KILO______________ _ _____ NEGLIGIBLE 
(Headings of the form which cannot be completed 
or are not applicable are omitted.) 
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lAG 385 (14 Feb 58)1 
By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army: 
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, 
General, United States Army, 
Official: Ohief of Staff. 
HERBERT M. JONES, 
Major General. United States Army, 
The .4.djutant General. 
Distribution: 
90 
Active Army: 
DCSPER (5) 
ACS! (15) 
DCSOPS (5) 
DCSLOG (5) 
ACSRC (5) 
Technical Stf, DA (5) 
USCONARC (40) 
US ARADCOM (5) 
US ARADCOM Rgn (5) 
OS Maj Comd (10) except 
USAREUR (25), 
USARJ /UNO/ EA (R) (25) 
OS Base Comd (3) 
Log Comd (3) 
MDW (3) 
Armies (5) 
Corps (5) 
Div (5) 
Brig (2) 
Regt/Gpfbg (4) 
Ft &: Camps (2) 
USMA (50) 
Svc Colleges (5) except USA CGSC 
(50) 
NG: State AG (2). 
USAR: TOE: 3-500 (IA, IB) (5). 
Br Svc Sch (5) except 
USACMLCSCH (100) 
Gen Depots (2) 
Sup Sec, Gen Depots (2) 
Depots (2) 
Ports of Emb (OS) (5) 
Trans Terminal Comd (5) 
Army Terminals (5) 
OS Sup Agcy (3) 
PG (2) 
Arsenals (2) 
Mil Dist (2) 
USA Corps (Res) (2) 
Sectors, USA Corps (Res) (2) 
USAINTO (50) 
MAAG (1) 
Mil Mis (1) 
ARMA (1) 
Units organized under following 
TOE's: 
3-500 (IA, IB) (2) 
30-000 (AA, AE, MI) (2) 
For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50. 
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U. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 19U 
WARNING NOTICES 
Authority for release of this document to a foreign 
government must be secured from the Assistant Chief 
of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army. 
When this document is released to a foreign 
government, it is released subject to the following 
conditions: This information is furnished with the 
understanding that it will not be released l'o another 
nation without speci fic approva l of the_ United States 
of America, Department of the A rmyi that it will 
not be used for other than military purposes; that 
individual or corporation rights originating in the 
information whether patented or not will be respected; 
and that the informa tion will be afforded substantially 
the same degree of security as affordel by the United 
States of America, Department of the Army. 
This document contains information affecting the 
national defense of the United States within the 
meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U. S. C., 
sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revela-
tion of its contents in any manner to an una uthorized 
person is prohibited by law. 
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